ELECTORAL MOTIVES, PARTISAN MOTIVES AND DYNAMIC OPTIMALITY WITH MANY TAXES: AN INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATION

被引：0

作者：

Christopoulos, Dimitris K.

Loizides, John ^{[1
]}

Tsionas, Efthymios G. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Athens Univ Econ & Business, Dept Int & European Econ Studies, Athens, Greece

[2] Athens Univ Econ & Business, Dept Econ, Athens, Greece

来源：

SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY | 2009年 / 56卷 / 01期

关键词：

H21; E52; Tax smoothing; distortions; random walk; electoral and partisan motives; UNIT-ROOT TESTS; OPTIMAL TAXATION; POSITIVE THEORY; GOVERNMENT; POLICY; PANEL; DEFICITS; STATES; HYPOTHESIS; CANADA;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1467-9485.2009.00474.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper, we argue that tax-smoothing results based on total tax revenues may be of limited importance if in fact governments are concerned with the inter-temporal distortionary effects of many kinds of taxes, when electoral and partisan motives also have to be taken into account. We develop an inter-temporal model that predicts that tax revenue mix should follow random walks. The model is tested with international data using both time series and panel-based unit root tests. We find that during the examined period, 1973-2003, governments are not optimizing tax components in the sense of Barro.

引用

页码：94 / 113

页数：20

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