TRUST AND CHEATING

被引：23

作者：

Butler, Jeff

Giuliano, Paola ^{[1
]}

Guiso, Luigi

机构：

[1] UCLA Anderson Sch Management, 110 Westwood Plaza,C517 Entrepreneurs Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA

来源：

ECONOMIC JOURNAL | 2016年 / 126卷 / 595期

关键词：

PROMISES; NORMS; GAMES;

D O I：

10.1111/ecoj.12271

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

When we take a taxi we may feel cheated if the driver takes an unnecessarily long route despite the lack of a contract to take the shortest possible path. Is the behaviour of the driver affected by beliefs about our cheating notions? We address this question in the context of a trust game. We find that both parties to a trust exchange have personal notions of cheating and that these notions have a bimodal distribution. We conceptualise cheating notions as moral expectations, which provide a micro-foundation for guilt. Cheating notions substantially affect decisions on both sides of the trust exchange.

引用

页码：1703 / 1738

页数：36

共 31 条

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[Anonymous], INT EC REV IN PRESS

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