Implementation of Passive Autocatalytic Recombiner System as a Hydrogen Mitigation System in Korean Nuclear Power Plants

Ensuring the containment integrity during a severe accident in nuclear power reactor by maintaining the hydrogen concentration below an acceptable level has been recognized to be of critical importance since Three Mile Island and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accidents. Although there exist various mitigation measures for hydrogen risk, a passive autocatalytic recombiner (PAR) has been emphasized as a viable option for the mitigation of hydrogen risk under the extended station blackout conditions due to its passive operation characteristics for the hydrogen removal. To enhance the capability of hydrogen control, the hydrogen mitigation system with various types of PARs has been implemented for all nuclear power plants in Korea. This paper presents an implementation procedure of PAR system and the analysis results to determine the location and capacity of PAR in OPR1000. Various accident scenarios have been adopted considering important event sequences from a combination of probabilistic methods, deterministic methods and sound engineering judgment. A MAAP 4.0.6+ with a multi-compartment model has been used as an analysis tool with conservative hydrogen generation and removal models. The detailed analyses have been performed for selected severe accident scenarios including sensitivity analysis with/without operations of various safety systems. The possibility of global flame acceleration (FA) and deflagration-to-detonation transient (DDT) has been assessed with sigma (flame acceleration potential) and 7-lambda (DDT potential) criterion. It is concluded that the newly designed hydrogen mitigation system with twenty-four (24) PARs can effectively remove containment atmosphere and prevent global FA and DDT.