Inequality of land tenure and revolutionary outcome: An economic analysis of China's land reform of 1946-1952

A paradoxical feature of China's land reform of 1946-1952 is that it was conducted far more radically in the north, where land tenure relations were far less unequal, than in the south where inequality of land tenure was distinctly more acute. That landlords could only be identified in south China was attributable to the sharply more active land rental market there, and the "single-cut" policy of defining the landlords narrowly as a rentier class. We attribute the predominance of an active land rental market in south China to three socioeconomic characteristics: 1) a sharply higher inequality in land distribution, 2) an organization of agriculture whose efficiency required the "unsupervised initiatives" of family labor, and 3) a distinctly higher proportion of "absentee landlords". Our hypothesis of land rentals being the only variable distinguishing the landlords from the rich peasants and only in south China is strongly supported by empirical evidence. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.