An empirical investigation of efficiency and price uniformity in competing auctions

被引：3

作者：

Andersson, T. ^{[1
]}

Andersson, C. ^{[1
]}

Andersson, F. ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] Lund Univ, Dept Econ, SE-22207 Lund, Sweden

[2] Res Inst Ind Econ, SE-10215 Stockholm, Sweden

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2012年 / 116卷 / 01期

关键词：

Competing auctions; Cross-bidding; Efficiency; Price uniformity;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2012.01.023

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper investigates hypotheses related to efficiency and price uniformity in online competing auctions based on two theoretical predictions from Peters and Severinov [Peters, M., Severinov, S., 2006. Internet auctions with many traders. Journal of Economic Theory 130, 220-245]. The investigation is conducted using a large and ideal data set for online competing train ticket auctions, and the findings support the theoretical predictions in large parts. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：99 / 101

页数：3

共 4 条

[1] Bidding behavior in competing auctions: Evidence from eBay [J].