Leaving the loners alone: Evolution of cooperation in the presence of antisocial punishment

被引：42

作者：

Garcia, Julian ^{[1
]}

Traulsen, Arne ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Max Planck Inst Evolutionary Biol, Evolutionary Theory Grp, D-24306 Plon, Germany

来源：

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY | 2012年 / 307卷

关键词：

Punishment; Cooperation; Collective action; Antisocial punishment; PUBLIC-GOODS; ALTRUISTIC PUNISHMENT; RETALIATION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.05.011

中图分类号：

Q [生物科学];

学科分类号：

07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;

摘要：

The idea that voluntary participation may promote the evolution of cooperation and punishment in public good games has been recently called into question based on the study of the complete strategy set in which anyone can punish anyone else. If punishment actions are detached from contribution and participation in the game, the combination of punishment and voluntary participation no longer leads to high levels of cooperation. We show that this result crucially depends on specific details of the role of those who abstain from the collective endeavour, and only holds for a small subset of assumptions. If these loners are truly alone, cooperators who punish only defectors prevail, even when antisocial punishment is available. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：168 / 173

页数：6

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