Intentionality, belief, and the logical problem of evil

被引：2

作者：

Pearce, Kenneth L. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Trinity Coll Dublin, Coll Green, Dept Philosophy, Dublin 2, Ireland

来源：

RELIGIOUS STUDIES | 2020年 / 56卷 / 03期

关键词：

WILL; COMPATIBILISM;

D O I：

10.1017/S0034412519000088

中图分类号：

B9 [宗教];

学科分类号：

010107 ;

摘要：

This article provides a new defence against the logical problem of evil, based on the naturalistic functional/teleological theory of mind (NFT). I argue that if the NFT is self-consistent then it is consistent with theism. Further, the NFT entails that it is not possible for created minds to exist in the absence of evil. It follows that if the NFT is self-consistent then the existence of God is consistent with the existence of evil.

引用

页码：419 / 435

页数：17

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