Climate policy and fiscal constraints: Do tax interactions outweigh carbon leakage?

被引:33
作者
Fischer, Carolyn [1 ]
Fox, Alan K. [2 ]
机构
[1] Resources Future Inc, Washington, DC 20036 USA
[2] US Int Trade Commiss ITC, Off Econ, Washington, DC 20436 USA
关键词
Climate policy; Carbon leakage; Tax interactions; Border adjustments;
D O I
10.1016/j.eneco.2012.09.004
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Climate policymaking faces twin challenges of carbon leakage and public sector revenue requirements. A large literature advocates the use of CO2 pricing and recycling the revenues to lower distorting taxes as a way to minimize costs. In this paper, we explore the implications of labor tax interactions for cost-effectiveness of border adjustments and other measures to cope with leakage. We find that, for plausible values of labor supply elasticities, the cost savings from revenue recycling are significant from 15 to 25%. The cost savings from anti-leakage measures are generally smaller, but also significant, particularly for small coalitions or more binding reduction targets. Tax interactions further enhance the cost savings from border adjustments, but make other measures like rebates or exemptions less attractive. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:S218 / S227
页数:10
相关论文
共 26 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], 15899 NAT BUR EC RES
[2]  
[Anonymous], BUDG EC OUTL FISC YE
[3]  
[Anonymous], 0912 RES FUT
[4]  
Babiker MH, 2005, ENERG J, V26, P99
[5]  
Balistreri E., 2012, SUBOPTIMAL NATURE AP
[6]  
Ballard C., 2000, How many hours are in a simulated day? The effects of time endowment on the results of tax-policy simulation models
[7]   Is there a rationale for output-based rebating of environmental levies? [J].
Bernard, Alain L. ;
Fischer, Carolyn ;
Fox, Alan K. .
RESOURCE AND ENERGY ECONOMICS, 2007, 29 (02) :83-101
[8]   Unilateral climate policy design: Efficiency and equity implications of alternative instruments to reduce carbon leakage [J].
Boehringer, Christoph ;
Carbone, Jared C. ;
Rutherford, Thomas F. .
ENERGY ECONOMICS, 2012, 34 :S208-S217
[9]  
Bohringer C., 2011, 1134 RES FUT
[10]  
Bovenberg AL, 1996, AM ECON REV, V86, P985