Fisher's behaviour with individual vessel quotas-Over-capacity and potential rent Five case studies

被引：49

作者：

Asche, Frank ^{[1
]}

Eggert, Hakan ^{[2
]}

Gudmundsson, Eyjolfur ^{[3
]}

Hoff, Ayoe ^{[4
]}

Pascoe, Sean ^{[5
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Stavanger, N-4036 Stavanger, Norway

[2] Gothenburg Univ, S-41124 Gothenburg, Sweden

[3] Univ Akureyri, Akureyri, Iceland

[4] Univ Copenhagen, Food & Econ Inst, DK-1168 Copenhagen, Denmark

[5] CSIRO Marine & Atmospher Res, Clayton, Vic, Australia

来源：

MARINE POLICY | 2008年 / 32卷 / 06期

关键词：

Fisheries management; Resource rent; Over-capacity; Individual vessel quotas; Incentives;

D O I：

10.1016/j.marpol.2008.01.007

中图分类号：

X [环境科学、安全科学];

学科分类号：

08 ; 0830 ;

摘要：

Internationally, individual vessel quotas (IVQ) have become an increasingly popular management tool. The main attraction of IVQs is the incentives they create for cost savings, autonomous capacity adjustment and, subsequently, rent generation. In this paper, the extent to which different IVQ systems have facilitated resource rent generation and capacity adjustment in five European countries-Den mark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the UK-is examined. The potential economic rents and the capacity reduction necessary to achieve these rents in each of the fisheries are also estimated. Reasons wily IVQs have not achieved their potential economic benefits in these fisheries are also examined. (C) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：920 / 927

页数：8

共 20 条

[1] On the ITQ fisheries management system in Iceland [J].