Media versus Special Interests

被引：34
作者：
Dyck, Alexander [1 ]
Moss, David [2 ]
Zingales, Luigi [3 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S 1A1, Canada
[2] Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Univ Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS | 2013年 / 56卷 / 03期
关键词：
ELECTORAL COMPETITION; BIAS; IMPACT;
D O I：
10.1086/673216
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We argue that profit-maximizing media help to overcome the rational ignorance problem highlighted by Anthony Downs. By collecting news and combining it with entertainment, media are able to inform passive voters about regulation and other public policy issues, acting as a (partial) counterbalance to small but well-organized groups. To show the impact this information has on regulation, we document the effect muckraking magazines had on the voting patterns of U.S. representatives and senators on regulatory issues in the early part of the twentieth century. We also discuss the conditions under which media can serve to counterbalance special interests.
引用
收藏
页码：521 / 553
页数：33
相关论文
共 79 条
[1]  
Adams Samuel Hopkins, 1905, COLLIERS WEEKLY, P20
[2]  
Adams Samuel Hopkins, 1906, COLLIERS WEEKLY, P28
[3]  
Adams Samuel Hopkins, 1906, COLLIERS WEEKLY, P26
[4]  
Adams Samuel Hopkins, 1906, COLLIERS WEEKLY, P22
[5]  
Adams Samuel Hopkins, 1906, COLLIERS WEEKLY, P24
[6]  
Adams Samuel Hopkins, 1906, COLLIERS WEEKLY, P16
[7]  
Adams Samuel Hopkins, 1905, COLLIERS WEEKLY, P29
[8]  
Adams Samuel Hopkins, 1906, COLLIERS WEEKLY, P14
[9]  
Adams Samuel Hopkins, 1906, COLLIERS WEEKLY, P12
[10]  
Adams Samuel Hopkins, 1905, COLLIERS WEEKLY, P17
12345678