VAT Competition among China's Provincial Governments and the Regulation Suggestions

被引:0
作者
Huang Qing-hua [1 ]
Zhou Zhi-bo [2 ]
Lan Cao-ming [1 ]
机构
[1] Southwest Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Chongqing 400715, Peoples R China
[2] Bureau State Taxat Chongqing, Changqing 400715, Peoples R China
来源
2011 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MANAGEMENT SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING - 18TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, VOLS I AND II | 2011年
关键词
provincial government; value-added tax (VAT); tax competition; TAX COMPETITION; CAPITALIZATION; JURISDICTIONS; EFFICIENCY; TIEBOUT;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Since the tax distribution reform implemented in 1994, China has begun general VAT system, and has determined the above as the tax categories shared by both the central government and the local governments. Whereas, "Base Number Technique" sharing is implemented for the VAT revenue between the central and local governments; that is to say, the VAT revenues turned over by the provincial governments are shared by the central and local governments as per the proportion of 75%-25%. The local governments have independent economic benefit, and have strong motivation to perform VAT system, and thereby the VAT revenue increases greatly; however, a new tax competition of VAT is put on the stage. The paper, in the first place, reviews the relevant theories of tax competition, then lists the cross- provincial VAT competition forms in China and analyzes the economic effects caused by VAT competition, and finally, as per the latest theories of the international tax revenue circle, raises some regulation suggestions on the VAT competition behaviors between the provincial governments.
引用
收藏
页码:1325 / +
页数:3
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