Competition for procurement shares

被引：10

作者：

Alcalde, Jose ^{[1
]}

Dahm, Matthias ^{[2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Alicante, Dept Quantitat Methods & Econ Theory, Alicante 03071, Spain

[2] Univ Rovira & Virgili, Dept Econ, Reus 43204, Spain

[3] Univ Rovira & Virgili, CREIP, Reus 43204, Spain

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2013年 / 80卷

关键词：

Procurement auction; Affirmative action; AFFIRMATIVE-ACTION; BID PREFERENCES; AUCTIONS; SPLIT; ALLOCATION; PRICE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.007

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We propose a new procurement procedure that allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are the following: (i) Bidders have an incentive to participate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows variations in the extent to which affirmative action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even while accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement expenditures might be lower than under a standard auction format. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：193 / 208

页数：16

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