On informational uniqueness in differential games

被引：0

作者：

Correa, R ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Bombay, Dept Econ, Bombay 400054, Maharashtra, India

来源：

COMPUTATION IN ECONOMICS, FINANCE AND ENGINEERING: ECONOMIC SYSTEMS | 2000年

关键词：

differential games;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;

摘要：

It is shown that the general result on informationally nonunique Nash equilibria, in the loop model of dynamic games with perfect state information does not hold in situations of imperfect information. Copyright (C) 1998 IFAC.

引用

页码：189 / 192

页数：4