A Counterexample to Modus Tollens

被引：64

作者：

Yalcin, Seth ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC | 2012年 / 41卷 / 06期

关键词：

Conditionals; Probability operators; Epistemic modals; Probability; Dynamic semantics; Context; Common ground; Modus Ponens; Modus Tollens; CONDITIONALS;

D O I：

10.1007/s10992-012-9228-4

中图分类号：

B81 [逻辑学（论理学）];

学科分类号：

010104 ; 010105 ;

摘要：

This paper defends a counterexample to Modus Tollens, and uses it to draw some conclusions about the logic and semantics of indicative conditionals and probability operators in natural language. Along the way we investigate some of the interactions of these expressions with knows, and we call into question the thesis that all knowledge ascriptions have truth-conditions. A probabilistic dynamic semantics for probability operators, conditionals, and acceptance attitudes is developed around the idea of representing the common ground of a conversation as a set of probability spaces.

引用

页码：1001 / 1024

页数：24

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