Is property dualism better off than substance dualism?

被引：8

作者：

Lycan, William G. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ N Carolina, Dept Philosophy, Chapel Hill, NC 27599 USA

来源：

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES | 2013年 / 164卷 / 02期

关键词：

Mind-body problem; Cartesian dualism; Substance dualism; Property dualism;

D O I：

10.1007/s11098-012-9867-x

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

It is widely thought that mind-body substance dualism is implausible at best, though mere "property" dualism is defensible and even flourishing. This paper argues that substance dualism is no less plausible than property dualism and even has two advantages over it.

引用

页码：533 / 542

页数：10

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