Compensating Outside Directors with Stock: The Impact on Non-Primary Stakeholders

被引:13
作者
Deutsch, Yuval [1 ]
Valente, Mike [2 ]
机构
[1] York Univ, Schulich Sch Business, Toronto, ON M3J 1P3, Canada
[2] Univ Western Ontario, Richard Ivey Sch Business, London, ON N6A 3K7, Canada
关键词
Common agency theory; Corporate social responsibility; Outside director stock compensation; Stakeholder theory; CORPORATE SOCIAL-RESPONSIBILITY; BOARD COMPOSITION; FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE; CEO COMPENSATION; MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION; FIRM PERFORMANCE; AGENCY THEORY; GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP; INCENTIVES;
D O I
10.1007/s10551-012-1447-7
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Two obvious trends in corporate governance include broadening board accountability beyond shareholders' interests and paying outside directors with equity compensation (stock and stock options). By integrating common agency and instrumental stakeholder theories, we examine the effect of stock compensation on secondary stakeholders and a firm's participation in social issues, two areas where interests are less aligned with shareholder value. Consistent with our predictions, we found that while stock compensation may be an effective way to align directors' goals to those of shareholders, it has adverse effects on important non-shareholder constituencies in the company's operating environment.
引用
收藏
页码:67 / 85
页数:19
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