An empirical model of non-equilibrium behavior in games

被引:5
作者
Kline, Brendan [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Texas Austin, Dept Econ, Austin, TX 78712 USA
关键词
Games; heterogeneity; identification; non-equilibrium; strategic reasoning; PARTIALLY IDENTIFIED MODELS; RATIONALIZABLE STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR; MOMENT INEQUALITIES; COMPLETE INFORMATION; PREFERENTIAL CHOICE; ECONOMETRIC-MODELS; GUESSING GAMES; PLAYERS MODELS; BINARY GAMES; INFERENCE;
D O I
10.3982/QE647
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper studies the identification and estimation of the decision rules that individuals use to determine their actions in games, based on a structural econometric model of non-equilibrium behavior in games. The model is based primarily on various notions of limited strategic reasoning, allowing multiple modes of strategic reasoning and heterogeneity in strategic reasoning across individuals and within individuals. The paper proposes the model and provides sufficient conditions for point identification of the model. Then the model is estimated on data from an experiment involving two-player guessing games. The application illustrates the empirical relevance of the main features of the model.
引用
收藏
页码:141 / 181
页数:41
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