Borrower runs

被引：37

作者：

Bond, Philip ^{[1
]}

Rai, Ashok S. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Penn, Wharton Finance Dept, SHDH, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA

[2] Williams Coll, Dept Econ, Williamstown, MA 02167 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS | 2009年 / 88卷 / 02期

关键词：

Microfinance; Repayment incentives; Contagion; BANK RUNS; MICROFINANCE; MARKETS; GAMES; DEBT;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jdeveco.2008.06.005

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Microfinance institutions and other lenders in developing countries rely on the promise of future loans to induce repayment. However, if borrowers expect that others will default, and so loans will no longer be available in the future, then they will default as well. We refer to such contagion as a borrower run. The optimal lending contract must provide additional repayment incentives to counter this tendency to default. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：185 / 191

页数：7

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