Stock pledging and firm risk: Evidence from India

被引:34
作者
Chauhan, Yogesh [1 ]
Mishra, Ajay Kumar [2 ]
Spahr, Ronald W. [3 ]
机构
[1] Indian Inst Management, Dept Finance & Accounting, Raipur, Madhya Pradesh, India
[2] Indian Inst Technol IIT Kharagpur, Vinod Gupta Sch Management, Kharagpur, W Bengal, India
[3] Univ Memphis, Fogelman Coll Business & Econ, Memphis, TN 38152 USA
关键词
MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; PROPENSITY SCORE; INVESTMENT; MARKET; DIVERSIFICATION; OWNERSHIP; BEHAVIOR; CHOICE; EQUITY;
D O I
10.1111/fima.12326
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Pledging of personally held common stock is widespread in India, where pledging often serves as lender collateral for large shareholder and promoter personal debt acquisitions. This practice is exacerbated by high ownership concentrations in India, as promoters, often firm founders, control, on average, 51% of their firms' equity. We examine promoter stock pledging impacts on stock volatility, capital investment decisions, and firm performance, using a sample of 1,452 Indian firms. We find that pledging relatively large proportions of outstanding shares and substantial proportions of shares held by promoters exacerbates stock volatility, fosters lower risk capital investments, adversely affects firm values, and impedes longer-term performance.
引用
收藏
页码:261 / 280
页数:20
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