Government effectiveness in the provision of public goods: the role of institutional quality

被引:23
作者
Arora, Puneet [1 ]
Chong, Alberto [1 ,2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Georgia State Univ, Dept Econ, Atlanta, GA 30303 USA
[2] Univ Pacifico, Atlanta, GA 30302 USA
[3] Univ Pacifico, Lima, Peru
关键词
Institutions; taxes; quality of public services; regulation; development; UNOFFICIAL ACTIVITY; FISCAL-POLICY; DETERMINANTS; ECONOMICS; GROWTH; MODEL; FIRMS; HAND; HIDE;
D O I
10.1080/15140326.2018.1550593
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
While poorer countries have a much smaller public sector and correspondingly a smaller tax burden than richer countries, their economic performance has not been necessarily better. This paper discusses the role that institutional quality plays in determining governments effectiveness in delivering public goods and in, therefore, mediating the effects of higher taxation in an economy. A simple theoretical model shows that provision of public goods and optimal tax levels increase with improved institutional quality. Using firm-level perceptions data on the quality of public services and the tax burden, consistent with the predictions of our model, we find that a higher level of institutional quality bolsters positive perception of the quality of public services while at the same time moderating the view of the taxes as an obstacle to growth.
引用
收藏
页码:175 / 196
页数:22
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