Ownership structure and target returns

被引:52
作者
Bauguess, Scott W. [2 ,3 ]
Moeller, Sara B. [1 ]
Schlingemann, Frederik P. [1 ]
Zutter, Chad J. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Pittsburgh, Katz Grad Sch Business, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA
[2] Texas Tech Univ, Rawls Coll Business, Lubbock, TX 79409 USA
[3] Secur & Exchange Commiss, Washington, DC 20549 USA
关键词
Target returns; Ownership; Acquisitions; Firm value; CORPORATE-CONTROL; VOTING-RIGHTS; STOCK RETURNS; MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP; ACQUIRING FIRMS; MERGER ACTIVITY; TENDER OFFERS; ACQUISITIONS; PERFORMANCE; MARKET;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.09.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Contrary to past literature, ownership defined as "all officers and directors" of the target firm has no association with target returns. Rather, we find that inside (managerial) ownership has a positive relation with target returns, whereas active-outside (non-managing director) ownership has a negative relation with target returns. Using accounting-based versus market-based performance measures, we find that the relation between inside ownership and target returns is best explained by takeover anticipation. Using bidder and synergy returns we find that the relation between outside ownership and target returns is best explained by outsiders' willingness to share gains with the bidder. While the relations are more pronounced for non-tender deals, they also hold for tender offers when active-outside ownership is corporate rather than institutional. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:48 / 65
页数:18
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