The Behavioralist Goes to School: Leveraging Behavioral Economics to Improve Educational Performance
被引:136
作者:
Levitt, Steven D.
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Univ Chicago, Saieh Hall Econ,Room SHFE 434,1126 E 59th St, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAUniv Chicago, Saieh Hall Econ,Room SHFE 434,1126 E 59th St, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
Levitt, Steven D.
[1
,2
]
List, John A.
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机构:
NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Univ Chicago, Saieh Hall Econ,SHFE 415,1126 E 59th St, Chicago, IL 60637 USAUniv Chicago, Saieh Hall Econ,Room SHFE 434,1126 E 59th St, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
List, John A.
[2
,3
]
Neckermann, Susanne
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Univ Chicago, Saieh Hall Econ,SHFE 358,1126 E 59th St, Chicago, IL 60637 USAUniv Chicago, Saieh Hall Econ,Room SHFE 434,1126 E 59th St, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
Neckermann, Susanne
[4
]
Sadoff, Sally
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Univ Calif San Diego, Rady Sch Management, Wells Fargo Hall,Room 4W121,9500 Gilman Dr 0553, La Jolla, CA 92093 USAUniv Chicago, Saieh Hall Econ,Room SHFE 434,1126 E 59th St, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
Sadoff, Sally
[5
]
机构:
[1] Univ Chicago, Saieh Hall Econ,Room SHFE 434,1126 E 59th St, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Univ Chicago, Saieh Hall Econ,SHFE 415,1126 E 59th St, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
[4] Univ Chicago, Saieh Hall Econ,SHFE 358,1126 E 59th St, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
[5] Univ Calif San Diego, Rady Sch Management, Wells Fargo Hall,Room 4W121,9500 Gilman Dr 0553, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA
We explore the power of behavioral economics to influence the level of effort exerted by students in a low stakes testing environment. We find a substantial impact on test scores from incentives when the rewards are delivered immediately. There is suggestive evidence that rewards framed as losses outperform those framed as gains. Nonfinancial incentives can be considerably more cost-effective than financial incentives for younger students, but are less effective with older students. All motivating power of incentives vanishes when rewards are handed out with a delay. Our results suggest that the current set of incentives may lead to underinvestment.