Blockchain Meets Edge Computing: Stackelberg Game and Double Auction Based Task Offloading for Mobile Blockchain

被引:119
作者
Guo, Shaoyong [1 ]
Dai, Yao [1 ]
Guo, Song [2 ,3 ]
Qiu, Xuesong [1 ]
Qi, Feng [1 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Beijing Univ Posts & Telecommun, State Key Lab Networking & Switching Technol, Beijing 100876, Peoples R China
[2] Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Dept Comp, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[3] Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Res Inst Sustainable Urban Dev, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[4] Peng Cheng Lab, Cyberspace Secur Res Ctr, Shenzhen 518066, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金; 国家重点研发计划;
关键词
Edge computing; IoT; blockchain; resource management; task offloading; RESOURCE-ALLOCATION; ARCHITECTURE; IOT; ASSIGNMENT; SELECTION; SCHEME;
D O I
10.1109/TVT.2020.2982000
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
Blockchain technology is developing rapidly and has been applied in various aspects, among which there are broad prospects in Internet of Things (IoT). However, IoT mobile devices are restricted in communication and computation due to mobility and portability, so that they can't afford the high computing cost for blockchain mining process. To solve it, the free resources displayed on non-mining-devices and edge cloud are selected to construct collaborative mining network(CMN) to execute mining tasks for mobile blockchain. Miners can offload their mining tasks to non-mining-devices within a CMN or the edge cloud when there are insufficient resources. Considering competition for resource of non-mining-devices, resource allocation problem in a CMN is formulated as a double auction game, among which Bayes-Nash Equilibrium (BNE) is analyzed to figure out the optimal auction price. When offloading to edge cloud, Stackelberg game is adopted to model interactions between edge cloud operator and different CMNs to obtain the optimal resource price and devices' resource demands. The mechanism realizes improving the mining utility in mining networks while ensuring the maximum profit of edge cloud operator. Finally, profits of mining networks are compared with an existing mode which only considers offloading to edge cloud. Under the proposed mechanism, mining networks obtain 6.86% more profits on average.
引用
收藏
页码:5549 / 5561
页数:13
相关论文
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