A game theoretical model for the stimulation of public cooperation in environmental collaborative governance

被引:17
作者
Fang, Yinhai [1 ]
Perc, Matjaz [2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ]
Zhang, Hui [1 ]
机构
[1] Nanjing Forestry Univ, Coll Econ & Management, Nanjing 210037, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Maribor, Fac Nat Sci & Math, Koroska cesta 160, Maribor 2000, Slovenia
[3] China Med Univ, China Med Univ Hosp, Dept Med Res, Taichung, Taiwan
[4] Alma Mater Europaea, Slovenska ulica 17, Maribor 2000, Slovenia
[5] Complex Sci Hub Vienna, Josefstadterstr 39, A-1080 Vienna, Austria
来源
ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE | 2022年 / 9卷 / 11期
关键词
game theory; human behaviour; cooperation; mathematical model; common goods; PARTICIPATION; IMPACT; CHINA; PERFORMANCE; POLLUTION; AIR; POLITICS; DECENTRALIZATION; IMPLEMENTATION; INFORMATION;
D O I
10.1098/rsos.221148
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Digital technologies provide a convenient way for the public to participate in environmental governance. Therefore, by means of a two-stage evolutionary model, a new mechanism for promoting public cooperation is proposed to accomplish environmental collaborative governance. Interactive effects of government-enterprise environmental governance are firstly explored, which is the external atmosphere for public behaviour. Second, the evolutionary dynamics of public behaviour is analysed to reveal the internal mechanism of the emergence of public cooperation in environmental collaborative governance projects. Simulations reveal that the interaction of resource elements between government and enterprise is an important basis for environmental governance performance, and that governments can improve this as well as public cooperation by increasing the marginal governance propensity. Similarly, an increase in the government's fixed expenditure item of environmental governance can also significantly improve government-enterprise performance and public cooperation. And finally, the effect of government's marginal incentive propensity on public environmental governance is moderated by enterprises' marginal environmental governance propensity, so that simply increasing the government's marginal incentive propensity cannot improve the evolutionary stable state of public behaviour under the scenario where enterprises' marginal environmental governance propensity is low.
引用
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页数:17
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