Illegal Insider Trading and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Taiwan

被引:13
作者
Huang, Yu Chuan [1 ]
Hou, Nai Wen [1 ]
Cheng, Yao Jen [2 ]
机构
[1] Natl Kaohsiung First Univ Sci & Technol, Dept Risk Management & Insurance, Kaohsiung, Taiwan
[2] Chaoyang Univ Technol, Dept Golden Ager Ind Management, Taichung, Taiwan
关键词
corporate governance; earnings management; illegal insider trading; DIRECTOR CHARACTERISTICS; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; FIRM VALUE; OWNERSHIP; BOARD; IMPACT; PERFORMANCE; QUALITY; FRAUD;
D O I
10.2753/REE1540-496X4805S301
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This study examines the relationship between illegal insider trading and corporate governance. We analyze a sample of 156 cases: seventy-eight firms having illegal insider trading episodes and seventy-eight matched firms. We use three main factors-board composition, ownership structure, and financial reporting credibility-as well as other variables to measure corporate governance. The results reveal that CEO duality and domestic investors are significantly and negatively correlated with illegal insider trading. In addition, firms with less financial reporting credibility have a higher probability of illegal insider trading. Our evidence also supports the view that firms with financial troubles are more likely to engage in illegal insider trading.
引用
收藏
页码:6 / 22
页数:17
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