Battlefields are undergoing profound changes. Promises of increased precision, along with novel ways of verifying targets and ensuring accountability, accompany the introduction of new technologies. At the same time, many states, international and non-governmental organizations have voiced concerns over the increased levels and new types of uncertainty that emerging technologies may bring. This paper focuses on one particular technological development - autonomous weapons systems - and one particular risk associated with it - the possibility of unintended outcomes in the targeting of persons or objects. The submission centres on the law of armed conflict and more specifically on the relationship between unintended engagements and two relevant primary rules: the prohibition on making civilians the object of attack and the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks. Both prohibitions require reasonable decision-making. What is deemed reasonable depends on the availability of information on the status of targets and the modalities of attack. Given the importance of information, it is argued that a bolstered set of positive obligations to take steps (such as obligations to take precautions and to review new weapons) can act as information-generators, increasing the amount of knowledge available to parties to conflict in the planning and conduct of attacks and to other law appliers in considering the legality of particular engagements.