Mortgage market credit conditions and US Presidential elections

被引:13
作者
Antoniades, Alexis [1 ]
Calomiris, Charles W. [2 ]
机构
[1] Georgetown Univ Qatar, Doha, Qatar
[2] Columbia Business Sch, 3022 Broadway,Uris Hall 801, New York, NY 10027 USA
关键词
Mortgage credit supply; Voting; GOVERNMENT-OWNED BANKS; POLITICAL-ECONOMY; PARTISANSHIP; PREFERENCES; CONNECTIONS; VOTE;
D O I
10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101909
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Voters punish incumbent Presidential candidates for contractions in the county-level supply of mortgage credit during market-wide contractions of credit, but do not reward them for expansions in mortgage credit supply in boom times. Our primary focus is the Presidential election of 2008, which followed an unprecedented swing from very generous mortgage underwriting standards to a severe contraction of mortgage credit. Voters responded to the credit crunch by shifting their support away from the Republican Presidential candidate in 2008. That shift was large and particularly pronounced in states that typically vote Republican, and in swing states. Without it McCain would have received half the votes needed in nine crucial swing states to reverse the outcome of the election. We extend our analysis to the Presidential elections from 1996 to 2012 and find that voters only react to contractions, not expansions, of credit, and reactions are similar for Democratic and Republican incumbent parties.
引用
收藏
页数:20
相关论文
共 74 条
[1]  
Agarwal Sumit., 2012, Did the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Lead to Risky Lending?
[2]   Who's to Blame? The Distribution of Responsibility in Developing Democracies [J].
Alcaniz, Isabella ;
Hellwig, Timothy .
BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 2011, 41 :389-411
[3]   A MODEL OF THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF THE UNITED-STATES [J].
ALESINA, A ;
LONDREGAN, J ;
ROSENTHAL, H .
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1993, 87 (01) :12-33
[4]   Redistributive public employment [J].
Alesina, A ;
Baqir, R ;
Easterly, W .
JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS, 2000, 48 (02) :219-241
[5]  
Alesina A., 1997, POLITICAL CYCLES MAC
[6]  
[Anonymous], 2002, SOUTH ECON J
[7]  
[Anonymous], 1980, AM VOTER
[8]  
[Anonymous], 2014, NBER Working Paper no. 20501
[9]  
[Anonymous], 1988, Liberalism against populism: A confrontation between the theory of democracy and the theory of social choice
[10]  
Antoniad s Adonis, 2014, J FINC ANALYSIS