Vertical collusion between airports and airlines: An empirical test for the European case

被引：23
作者：
Barbot, Cristina [1 ]
D'Alfonso, Tiziana [2 ]
Malighetti, Paolo [3 ]
Redondi, Renato [4 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Porto, Fac Econ, CEF UP, P-4200 Oporto, Portugal
[2] Univ Roma La Sapienza, Dept Comp Control & Management Engn, I-00185 Rome, Italy
[3] Univ Bergamo, Dept Econ & Technol Management, I-24044 Dalmine, BG, Italy
[4] Univ Brescia, Dept Mech Engn, I-25123 Brescia, Italy
来源：
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART E-LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION REVIEW | 2013年 / 57卷
关键词：
Vertical collusion; Airport competition; Airline competition; PRICE ELASTICITIES; AIR-TRAVEL; DEMAND; MANUFACTURERS; COMPETITION; INFERENCE; RETAILERS; MARKETS;
D O I：
10.1016/j.tre.2013.01.002
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We develop a test for vertical collusion between airports and airlines in the case of two different scenarios. In the first scenario there is one airport and one airline; this intends to depict the case of airports that do not compete with any other one. In the second, we consider two competing airports and one airline that uses the airport as a base or a hub. In the case of non competing airports we find that gross margins are lower when there is vertical collusion. In the case of competing airports, we find that gross margins are equal when both pairs collude or do not collude. But in the case in which only one pair colludes, a merger between them brings a lower margin. We tested 36 pairs of airports-airlines in the case of non competing airports and we find evidence for vertical collusion with respect to: (i) main national carriers in small airports (ii) low cost carriers in secondary airports. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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收藏
页码：3 / 15
页数：13
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