Information aggregation in financial markets with career concerns

被引：51

作者：

Dasgupta, Amil ^{[1
]}

Prat, Andrea ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] London Sch Econ, London WC2A 2AE, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2008年 / 143卷 / 01期

基金：

英国工程与自然科学研究理事会;

关键词：

Financial equilibrium; Career concerns; Information cascades;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jet.2008.01.005

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

What are the equilibrium features of a dynamic financial market in which traders care about their reputation for ability? We modify a standard sequential trading model to include traders with career concerns. We show that this market cannot be informationally efficient: there is no equilibrium in which prices converge to the true value, even after an infinite sequence of trades. We characterize the most revealing equilibrium of this game and show that an increase in the strength of the traders' reputational concerns has a negative effect on the extent of information that can be revealed in equilibrium but a positive effect on market liquidity. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：83 / 113

页数：31

共 30 条

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