Endogenous matching and the empirical determinants of contract form

被引：240

作者：

Ackerberg, DA ^{[1
]}

Botticini, M

机构：

[1] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90024 USA

[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[3] Boston Univ, Boston, MA 02215 USA

[4] Univ Brescia, I-25121 Brescia, Italy

来源：

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY | 2002年 / 110卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/339712

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Empirical work on contracts typically regresses contract choice on observed principal and agent characteristics. If (i) some of these characteristics are unobserved or partially observed and (ii) there are incentives whereby particular types of agents end up contracting with particular types of principals, estimated coefficients on the observed characteristics may be misleading. We address this endogenous matching problem using a data set on agricultural contracts between landlords and tenants in early Renaissance Tuscany. Controlling for endogenous.

引用

页码：564 / 591

页数：28

共 57 条

[1] The choice of agrarian contracts in early Renaissance Tuscany: Risk sharing, moral hazard, or capital market imperfections? [J].