Study on Management and Compensation Mechanism of Transboundary Water Pollution Based on Game Theory

被引:0
作者
Xue Rui [1 ]
Liang Weichao [2 ]
机构
[1] Wuhan Univ Technol, Sch Foreign Languages, Wuhan 430070, Peoples R China
[2] Wuhan Univ Technol, Sch Management, Wuhan 430070, Peoples R China
来源
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 8TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INNOVATION AND MANAGEMENT | 2011年
关键词
Transboundary water; Cooperative management model; Nash equilibrium; Compensation payment; DYNAMIC GAME;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
River pollution in China is strikingly represented by transboundary water pollution. The article analyzes the issue of transboundary water pollution based on game theory angle, constructs a non-cooperative model of target quota reduction method and proposes league game model allowing transferring pollutant and reduction of cooperative management. In order to guarantee the stability of league game, Nash method is adopted as fair profit allocation in cooperative regions and paid compensation obtained by different cooperative alliance is further determined. In this way, economic superiority in different areas can be developed and the overall gains of the valley can reach to the maximum. The conclusion is of great significance for avoiding the old way of river pollution control in China as well as pushing cycling economy development.
引用
收藏
页码:148 / +
页数:2
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