The supertask argument against countable additivity

被引：2
作者：
Perez Laraudogoitia, Jon [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Basque Country, Fac Letras, Dept Log & Filosofia Ciencia, Vitoria 01006, Spain
来源：
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES | 2014年 / 168卷 / 03期
关键词：
Supertasks; Probability; Countable additivity; LOTTERY;
D O I：
10.1007/s11098-013-0146-2
中图分类号：
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要：
This paper proves that certain supertasks constitute counterexamples to countable additivity even in the frame of an objective (not subjective, A la de Finetti) conception of probability. The argument requires taking conditional probability as a primitive notion.
引用
收藏
页码：619 / 628
页数：10
相关论文
共 9 条
1