Information, fairness, and reciprocity in the best shot game

被引：9

作者：

Carpenter, JP ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Middlebury Coll, Dept Econ, Middlebury, VT 05753 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2002年 / 75卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

fairness; experiment; best shot; information; reciprocity;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00621-8

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Previous best shot experiments document behavior that converges towards the predicted equilibrium despite unequal equilibrium payoffs. Prasnikar and Roth [Quarterly Journal of Economics (1992) 865-888] hypothesize that strategic incentives displace fairness in this game. The current experiment illustrates that providing information differently results in fair outcomes. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science BY. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：243 / 248

页数：6

共 9 条

[1] ULTIMATUMS, DICTATORS AND MANNERS [J].

CAMERER, C ;

THALER, RH .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 1995, 9 (02) :209-219

[2]

CARPENTER J, 2001, J ECON PERSPECT, V9, P209

[3] Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device: Experimental evidence [J].

Fehr, E ;

Gachter, S ;

Kirchsteiger, G .

ECONOMETRICA, 1997, 65 (04) :833-860

[4]

Fouraker L. E., 1963, BARGAINING BEHAV

[5]

GUETH W, 1982, J ECON BEHAV ORGAN, V3, P367

[6]

GUETH W, 1990, J ECON PSYCHOL, V11, P417

[7] AN EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION OF WEAKEST LINK BEST SHOT MODELS OF PUBLIC-GOODS [J].

HARRISON, GW ;

HIRSHLEIFER, J .

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1989, 97 (01) :201-225

[8] CONSIDERATIONS OF FAIRNESS AND STRATEGY - EXPERIMENTAL-DATA FROM SEQUENTIAL GAMES [J].

PRASNIKAR, V ;

ROTH, AE .

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1992, 107 (03) :865-888

[9]

Roth A.V., 1995, HDB EXPT EC

← 1 →