Gender and say: A model of household behaviour with endogenously determined balance of power

被引:183
作者
Basu, K [1 ]
机构
[1] Cornell Univ, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01092.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The evidence that the same income can lead to different household decisions, depending on who the earner is, has led to an effort to replace the standard household model with the 'collective model', which recognises that a household's decisions depend on the power balance between the husband and the wife. This article recognises that the power balance can, in turn, depend on the decisions made. A new 'household equilibrium' and its dynamics are described and it is shown that there can be multiple equilibria in female labour-supply, and that child labour can decline and rise as the wife's power increases.
引用
收藏
页码:558 / 580
页数:23
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