The deep-pocket effect of internal capital markets

被引:74
作者
Boutin, Xavier [1 ]
Cestone, Giacinta [2 ,3 ]
Fumagalli, Chiara [4 ]
Pica, Giovanni [5 ,6 ]
Serrano-Velarde, Nicolas [7 ,8 ]
机构
[1] Commiss European Communities, DG Competit Chief Economist Team, B-1049 Brussels, Belgium
[2] City Univ London, Cass Business Sch, London, England
[3] ECGI, Brussels, Belgium
[4] Univ Bocconi, Dept Econ, I-20136 Milan, Italy
[5] Univ Salerno, Salerno, Italy
[6] Ctr Luca DAgliano, Milan, Italy
[7] Univ Bocconi, I-20136 Milan, Italy
[8] Univ Oxford, Ctr Business Taxat, Oxford OX1 2JD, England
关键词
Business groups; Cash holdings; Internal capital markets; Entry; INVESTMENT; EXIT; ENTRY; OWNERSHIP; CONSTRAINTS; COMPETITION; RESPONSES; CYCLE; SIDE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We provide evidence that incumbent and entrant firms' access to business group deep pockets affects the entry patterns in product markets. Relying on a unique French data set on business groups, our paper shows that entry into manufacturing industries is negatively related to the cash hoarded by incumbent affiliated groups and positively related to entrant groups' cash. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that the impact of group cash holdingson entry is more important in environments where financial constraints are pronounced. The cash holdings of incumbent and entrant groups also affect the survival rate of entrants in the three- to five-year post-entry window. Overall, our findings suggest that internal capital markets operate within corporate groups and affect the product market behavior of affiliated firms by mitigating financial constraints. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:122 / 145
页数:24
相关论文
共 62 条
[51]   Trade liberalization, exit, and productivity improvements: Evidence from Chilean plants [J].
Pavcnik, N .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2002, 69 (01) :245-276
[52]   Red barons or robber barons? Governance and investment in Russian financial-industrial groups [J].
Perotti, EC ;
Gelfer, S .
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2001, 45 (09) :1601-1617
[53]   The cost of diversity: The diversification discount and inefficient investment [J].
Rajan, R ;
Servaes, H ;
Zingales, L .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2000, 55 (01) :35-80
[54]  
Rajan R.:., 2010, Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy
[55]  
Samphantharak K., 2006, INTERNAL CAPIT UNPUB
[56]   The dark side of internal capital markets: Divisional rent-seeking and inefficient investment [J].
Scharfstein, DS ;
Stein, JC .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2000, 55 (06) :2537-2564
[57]   Are internal capital markets efficient? [J].
Shin, HH ;
Stulz, RM .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1998, 113 (02) :531-552
[58]  
Skalitz A., 2002, INSEE PREMIERE, V836, P1
[59]  
Stein J.C., 2003, Handbook of the Economics of Finance, V1
[60]   CUTTHROAT COMPETITION AND LONG PURSE [J].
TELSER, LG .
JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1966, 9 (OCT) :259-277