The effect of corporate governance on CEO luck: Evidence from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)

被引：9

作者：

Chintrakarn, Pandej ^{[1
]}

Jiraporn, Pornsit ^{[2
]}

Kim, J. C. ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] MUIC, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand

[2] Penn State Univ, Great Valley Sch Grad Profess Studies, Malvern, PA 19355 USA

[3] No Kentucky Univ, Highland Hts, KY 41099 USA

来源：

FINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS | 2013年 / 10卷 / 04期

关键词：

Corporate governance; Option backdating; Lucky CEOs; Institutional Shareholder Services; Agency theory; Agency conflict; QUALITY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.frl.2013.06.001

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

CEOs are "lucky" when they receive stock option grants on days when the stock price is the lowest in the month of the grant, implying opportunistic timing. Extending the work of Bebchuk et al. (2010), we explore the effect of overall corporate governance quality on CEO luck. Provided by the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), our comprehensive governance metrics are much broader than those used in prior studies, encompassing more diverse aspects of corporate governance, such as audit, state laws, boards, ownership, and director education. We show that an improvement in governance quality by one standard deviation diminishes CEO luck by 14.77-21.06%. The governance standards recommended by ISS appear to be effective in deterring the opportunistic timing of option grants. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：169 / 174

页数：6

共 6 条

[1] Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors [J].