Activity and inactivity in a rent-seeking contest with private information

被引：15

作者：

Schoonbeek, L ^{[1
]}

Winkel, BM ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Groningen, Dept Econ, NL-9700 AV Groningen, Netherlands

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 2006年 / 127卷 / 1-2期

关键词：

Public Finance; Private Information; Equilibrium Effort; Identical Valuation;

D O I：

10.1007/s11127-006-7974-y

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider a rent-seeking contest in which one player has private information about his own valuation of the prize. This valuation may be either high or low. All other players have a known and identical valuation of the prize. We present necessary and sufficient conditions under which the privately informed player exerts a positive or zero equilibrium effort.

引用

页码：123 / 132

页数：10

共 9 条

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