Robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions

被引：11

作者：

Anbarci, Nejat ^{[1
]}

Sun, Ching-jen ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Deakin Univ, Sch Accounting Econ & Finance, Burwood, Vic 3125, Australia

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2013年 / 77卷 / 01期

关键词：

Nash's bargaining problem; Robustness; Intermediate agreements; The Discrete Raiffa solution; The Nash solution; Proportional solutions; STATUS-QUO SETS; PROPORTIONAL SOLUTIONS; DISAGREEMENT POINT; NASH;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2012.11.001

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Most real-life bargaining is resolved gradually. During this process parties reach intermediate agreements. These intermediate agreements serve as disagreement points in subsequent rounds. We identify robustness criteria which are satisfied by three prominent bargaining solutions, the Nash, Proportional (and as a special case to the Egalitarian solution) and Discrete Raiffa solutions. We show that the "robustness of intermediate agreements" plus additional well-known and plausible axioms, provide novel axiomatizations of the above-mentioned solutions. Hence, we provide a unified framework for comparing these solutions' bargaining theories. (c) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：367 / 376

页数：10

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