Hierarchies of power in non-binary social choice

被引：2

作者：

Sanchez, M. Carmen

Peris, Josep E. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Alacant, Dept Fonaments Anal Econ, Alacant 03080, Spain

[2] Univ Murcia, Dept Fundamentos Anal Econ, E-30100 Murcia, Spain

来源：

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS | 2006年 / 42卷 / 7-8期

关键词：

fixed agenda; social choice; hierarchy; dictator; veto power; oligarchy;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.03.007

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In the context of fixed agenda social choice correspondences, and by imposing usual axioms, we prove that power is distributed among either a non-complete hierarchy of dictators or of individuals with veto power in the society, which allows us to explicitly describe the social choice set as an alternative maximization process. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：843 / 853

页数：11

共 8 条

[1] HIERARCHICAL VOTING [J].