What we epistemically owe to each other

被引：86

作者：

Basu, Rima ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Claremont Mckenna Coll, 850 Columbia Ave, Claremont, CA 91711 USA

来源：

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES | 2019年 / 176卷 / 04期

关键词：

Epistemic duties; Epistemic obligations; Doxastic wronging; Ethics of belief; Wronging beliefs;

D O I：

10.1007/s11098-018-1219-z

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

This paper is about an overlooked aspectthe cognitive or epistemic aspectof the moral demand we place on one another to be treated well. We care not only how people act towards us and what they say of us, but also what they believe of us. That we can feel hurt by what others believe of us suggests both that beliefs can wrong and that there is something we epistemically owe to each other. This proposal, however, surprises many theorists who claim it lacks both intuitive and theoretical support. This paper argues that the proposal has intuitive support and is not at odds with much contemporary theorizing about what we owe to each other.

引用

页码：915 / 931

页数：17