Cooperate or Not Cooperate in Predictable but Periodically Varying Situations? Cooperation in Fast Oscillating Environment

In this work, the cooperation problem between two populations in a periodically varying environment is discussed. In particular, the two-population prisoner's dilemma game with periodically oscillating payoffs is discussed, such that the time-average of these oscillations over the period of environmental variations vanishes. The possible overlaps of these oscillations generate completely new dynamical effects that drastically change the phase space structure of the two-population evolutionary dynamics. Due to these effects, the emergence of some level of cooperators in both populations is possible under certain conditions on the environmental variations. In the domain of stable coexistence the dynamics of cooperators in each population form stable cycles. Thus, the cooperators in each population promote the existence of cooperators in the other population. However, the survival of cooperators in both populations is not guaranteed by a large initial fraction of them.