Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

被引：170

作者：

Einav, Liran ^{[1
,2
]}

Finkelstein, Amy ^{[2
,3
]}

Ryan, Stephen P. ^{[2
,4
]}

Schrimpf, Paul ^{[5
]}

Cullen, Mark R. ^{[2
,6
]}

机构：

[1] Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[3] MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA

[4] Univ Texas Austin, Dept Econ, Austin, TX 78712 USA

[5] Univ British Columbia, Dept Econ, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z1, Canada

[6] Stanford Univ, Sch Med, Dept Internal Med, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2013年 / 103卷 / 01期

关键词：

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; WELFARE; ECONOMICS; MODELS; COST; PLAN;

D O I：

10.1257/aer.103.1.178

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral ("moral hazard") response to insurance, a phenomenon we label "selection on moral hazard." Using a model of plan choice and medical utilization, we present evidence of heterogenous moral hazard as well as selection on it, and explore some of its implications. For example, we show that, at least in our context, abstracting from selection on moral hazard could lead to overestimates of the spending reduction associated with introducing a high-deductible health insurance option. (JEL D82, G22, I13, J32)

引用

页码：178 / 219

页数：42

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