A LEGALIZATION THEORY BASED RESPONSE TO TIMOTHY WEBSTER'S "PAPER COMPLIANCE" OF CHINA IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

被引:0
作者
Ma, Guang [1 ]
Li, Jiang [2 ]
机构
[1] Zhejiang Univ, Guanghua Law Sch, Law, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, Peoples R China
[2] China Renmin Univ, Int Law, Beijing, Peoples R China
来源
ASIAN JOURNAL OF WTO & INTERNATIONAL HEALTH LAW AND POLICY | 2015年 / 10卷 / 02期
关键词
WTO DSM; legalization; precision; obligation; delegation; compliance theory; paper compliance; compliance assessment; INTERNATIONAL-RELATIONS THEORY; TRADING RIGHTS; LAW; RESOLUTION; JUDICIALIZATION; PUBLICATIONS; CHALLENGE; POLITICS; JUSTICE; LIMITS;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
R19 [保健组织与事业(卫生事业管理)];
学科分类号
摘要
According to Legalization theory, specific legalization can be deconstructed as three sine qua non: precision, obligation and delegation. From the vantage point of legalization, WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) is more legalized than its predecessor under General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT). Timothy Webster, an American professor, attempts to apply "paper compliance" theory (or concept) to generalize China's compliance with WTO decisions. Basing on legalization theory, the paper tries to evidence the untenability of "paper compliance". The panorama of Chinese compliance is so complex that any single theory seems to be unable to capture the whole story. Besides, the paper holds that compliance assessment should target at the behaviors of compliance rather than the subjects themselves. Theoretically, to maintain compulsion, legitimacy and efficacy of WTO, compliance assessment shall not deviate from WTO legalization framework. Empirically, China has a relatively good, if not perfect, record of compliance with WTO decisions on the whole. The paper demonstrates that "paper compliance" is wrongly constructed theoretically and poorly grounded In conclusion, "paper compliance" is illogical and untenable.
引用
收藏
页码:541 / 590
页数:50
相关论文
共 139 条
[1]   The concept of legalization [J].
Abbott, KW ;
Keohane, RO ;
Moravcsik, A ;
Slaughter, AM ;
Snidal, D .
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 2000, 54 (03) :401-+
[2]   Why states act through formal international organizations [J].
Abbott, KW ;
Snidal, D .
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 1998, 42 (01) :3-32
[3]   Using negotiation to promote legitimacy: an assessment of proposals for reforming the WTO [J].
Albin, Cecilia .
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 2008, 84 (04) :757-+
[4]   Resolving or exacerbating disputes? The WTO's new dispute resolution system [J].
Alter, KJ .
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 2003, 79 (04) :783-+
[5]  
Anderson K, 2005, HARVARD LAW REV, V118, P1255
[6]  
[Anonymous], FORDHAM INT LAW J
[7]  
[Anonymous], ZHENGFA LUDAN
[8]  
[Anonymous], WTDS350
[9]  
[Anonymous], WTDS36317
[10]  
[Anonymous], FAZHEXUE TONGLUN