On the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players

被引：54
作者：
Khan, MA
Rath, KP
Sun, YN
机构：
[1] UNIV NOTRE DAME, DEPT ECON, NOTRE DAME, IN 46556 USA
[2] NATL UNIV SINGAPORE, DEPT MATH, SINGAPORE 117548, SINGAPORE
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1997年 / 76卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2292
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We present results on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in nonatomic games. We also show by means of counterexamples that the stringent conditions on the cardinality of action sets cannot be relaxed, and thus resolve questions which have remained open since Schmeidler's 1973 paper. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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页码：13 / 46
页数：34
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