Corporate governance and earnings management nexus: Evidence from theUKand Egypt using neural networks

被引:58
作者
Abdou, Hussein A. [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Ellelly, Nouran N. [4 ,5 ]
Elamer, Ahmed A. [6 ]
Hussainey, Khaled [7 ]
Yazdifar, Hassan [8 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cent Lancashire, Lancashire Sch Business & Enterprise, Preston PR1 2HE, Lancs, England
[2] Univ Cent Lancashire, Fac Business & Justice, Preston PR1 2HE, Lancs, England
[3] Mansoura Univ, Fac Commerce, Dept Management, Mansoura, Egypt
[4] Portsaid Univ, Accounting Dept, Portsaid, Egypt
[5] Portsaid Univ, Fac Commerce, Portsaid, Egypt
[6] Brunel Univ London, Brunel Business Sch, Uxbridge, Middx, England
[7] Portsmouth Univ, Portsmouth Business Sch, Dept Accounting & Financial Management, Portsmouth, Hants, England
[8] Bournemouth Univ, Dept Accounting Finance & Econ, Bournemouth, Dorset, England
关键词
corporate governance; corruption; earnings management; governance quality; neural networks; BOARD COMPOSITION; AUDIT COMMITTEE; MULTIPLE-REGRESSION; FEMALE DIRECTORS; IMPACT; FIRM; INDEPENDENCE; ASSOCIATION; PERFORMANCE; CORRUPTION;
D O I
10.1002/ijfe.2120
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Using conventional regressions and generalized regression neural networks (GRNNs), we examine the relationship between corporate governance (CG) and earnings management (EM). We also examine whether governance quality moderates the association between EM and CG for a sample of British and Egyptian companies. Our findings show that: (a) UK firms are likely to have lower levels of EM if they: have smaller boards, are dominated by independent outside directors, and have a low percentage of female directors; (b) Egyptian firms are likely to have lower levels of EM if they: have larger boards, are dominated by independent outside directors, and have a low percentage of female directors; (c) The governance quality (control of corruption) has a significant hidden effect on EM. Since our results provide empirical evidence that the board of directors plays a vital role in mitigating EM, these findings might lead to an improvement in the credibility of financial statements for investors in both the UK and Egypt. As policy implications, our findings inform regulators and policy-makers that corruption has a very strong hidden effect on EM and that they can deter EM by controlling the corruption level in their countries.
引用
收藏
页码:6281 / 6311
页数:31
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