Corporate governance and earnings management nexus: Evidence from theUKand Egypt using neural networks

被引:58
作者
Abdou, Hussein A. [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Ellelly, Nouran N. [4 ,5 ]
Elamer, Ahmed A. [6 ]
Hussainey, Khaled [7 ]
Yazdifar, Hassan [8 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cent Lancashire, Lancashire Sch Business & Enterprise, Preston PR1 2HE, Lancs, England
[2] Univ Cent Lancashire, Fac Business & Justice, Preston PR1 2HE, Lancs, England
[3] Mansoura Univ, Fac Commerce, Dept Management, Mansoura, Egypt
[4] Portsaid Univ, Accounting Dept, Portsaid, Egypt
[5] Portsaid Univ, Fac Commerce, Portsaid, Egypt
[6] Brunel Univ London, Brunel Business Sch, Uxbridge, Middx, England
[7] Portsmouth Univ, Portsmouth Business Sch, Dept Accounting & Financial Management, Portsmouth, Hants, England
[8] Bournemouth Univ, Dept Accounting Finance & Econ, Bournemouth, Dorset, England
关键词
corporate governance; corruption; earnings management; governance quality; neural networks; BOARD COMPOSITION; AUDIT COMMITTEE; MULTIPLE-REGRESSION; FEMALE DIRECTORS; IMPACT; FIRM; INDEPENDENCE; ASSOCIATION; PERFORMANCE; CORRUPTION;
D O I
10.1002/ijfe.2120
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Using conventional regressions and generalized regression neural networks (GRNNs), we examine the relationship between corporate governance (CG) and earnings management (EM). We also examine whether governance quality moderates the association between EM and CG for a sample of British and Egyptian companies. Our findings show that: (a) UK firms are likely to have lower levels of EM if they: have smaller boards, are dominated by independent outside directors, and have a low percentage of female directors; (b) Egyptian firms are likely to have lower levels of EM if they: have larger boards, are dominated by independent outside directors, and have a low percentage of female directors; (c) The governance quality (control of corruption) has a significant hidden effect on EM. Since our results provide empirical evidence that the board of directors plays a vital role in mitigating EM, these findings might lead to an improvement in the credibility of financial statements for investors in both the UK and Egypt. As policy implications, our findings inform regulators and policy-makers that corruption has a very strong hidden effect on EM and that they can deter EM by controlling the corruption level in their countries.
引用
收藏
页码:6281 / 6311
页数:31
相关论文
共 98 条
[1]   DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN THE UK RETAIL INDUSTRY: A COMPARISON OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION AND GENERALIZED REGRESSION NEURAL NETWORK [J].
Abdou, Hussein A. ;
Kuzmic, Andzelika ;
Pointon, John ;
Lister, Roger J. .
INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS IN ACCOUNTING FINANCE & MANAGEMENT, 2012, 19 (03) :151-169
[2]   A variable impact neural network analysis of dividend policies and share prices of transportation and related companies [J].
Abdou, Hussein A. ;
Pointon, John ;
El-Masry, Ahmed ;
Olugbode, Moji ;
Lister, Roger J. .
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS INSTITUTIONS & MONEY, 2012, 22 (04) :796-813
[3]   Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance [J].
Adams, Renee B. ;
Ferreira, Daniel .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2009, 94 (02) :291-309
[4]   Earnings management practices from the perspective of external and internal auditors Evidence from Jordan [J].
Al-khabash, Ahmed A. ;
Al-Thuneibat, Ali A. .
MANAGERIAL AUDITING JOURNAL, 2008, 24 (01) :58-+
[5]   What is the Relationship Between REIT Governance and Earnings Management? [J].
Anglin, Paul ;
Edelstein, Robert ;
Gao, Yanmin ;
Tsang, Desmond .
JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND ECONOMICS, 2013, 47 (03) :538-563
[6]  
[Anonymous], 2015, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIO
[7]   Female directors and earnings management: Evidence from UK companies [J].
Arun, Thankom Gopinath ;
Almahrog, Yousf Ebrahem ;
Aribi, Zakaria Ali .
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS, 2015, 39 :137-146
[8]  
ATIK Asuman., 2009, Critical Perspectives of Accounting, V20, P591
[9]   Consensus in Diverse Corporate Boards [J].
Baranchuk, Nina ;
Dybvig, Philip H. .
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2009, 22 (02) :715-747
[10]  
Becht M, 2003, HANDB ECON, V21, P1