The economist in tort litigation

被引:11
作者
Thornton, R [1 ]
Ward, J
机构
[1] Lehigh Univ, Bethlehem, PA 18015 USA
[2] Univ Missouri, Kansas City, MO 64110 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/jep.13.2.101
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In recent decades, the involvement of economists as consultants and expert witnesses in civil tort actions has grown rapidly. In this article, the authors discuss the reasons for this phenomenon and the extent to conflicts of interest to arise in the practice of what is frequently called 'forensic economics.' They argue that, although conflict-of-interest pressures exist, the limited evidence does not indicate that unethical practices are rampant within the profession. Moreover, market correctives, judicial screening, codes of ethical behavior, and the dissemination of knowledge concerning proper forensic practice help to serve as (arguably imperfect) safeguards against unethical practice.
引用
收藏
页码:101 / 112
页数:12
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