Discrete choice models of firms' strategic decisions

被引：13

作者：

Draganska, Michaela ^{[1
]}

Misra, Sanjog ^{[2
]}

Aguirregabiria, Victor ^{[3
]}

Bajari, Pat ^{[4
]}

Einav, Liran ^{[5
]}

Ellickson, Paul ^{[6
]}

Horsky, Dan ^{[2
]}

Narayanan, Sridhar ^{[1
]}

Orhun, Yesim ^{[7
]}

Reiss, Peter ^{[1
]}

Seim, Katja ^{[8
]}

Singh, Vishal ^{[9
]}

Thomadsen, Raphael ^{[10
]}

Zhu, Ting ^{[7
]}

机构：

[1] Grad Sch Business Stanford, Stanford, CA USA

[2] Univ Rochester, Rochester, NY USA

[3] Univ Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada

[4] Univ Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN USA

[5] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

[6] Duke Univ, Durham, NC USA

[7] Univ Chicago, Grad Sch Business, Chicago, IL 60637 USA

[8] Wharton Sch Business, Philadelphia, PA USA

[9] NYU, Stern Sch Business, New York, NY USA

[10] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Anderson Sch Business, Los Angeles, CA USA

来源：

MARKETING LETTERS | 2008年 / 19卷 / 3-4期

关键词：

Empirical discrete games; Market entry; Discrete choice; Marketing;

D O I：

10.1007/s11002-008-9060-3

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper outlines the methods and applications related to the nascent area of empirical discrete games in marketing. Many key strategic decisions firms make involve discrete choices such as deciding the location of a new store, determining where in product space to position a product, or what options to offer in a service contract. These decisions are fairly complex and typically involve the consideration of a number of demand, cost, and competitive factors. What makes these discrete choices particularly interesting (and challenging to analyze) is that they are interrelated with the choices of other firms because firms take into account the actions of their competitors when making their own decisions. We describe the basic problem of dealing with interrelated discrete choices in a game-theoretic framework and present the various estimation methods available. A discussion of the existing applications and future research opportunities concludes the article.

引用

页码：399 / 416

页数：18

共 46 条

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