A Generic Framework for Automated Multi-attribute Negotiation

被引：61
作者：
Lai, Guoming [1 ]
Sycara, Katia [2 ]
机构：
[1] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Tepper Sch Business, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA
[2] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Inst Robot, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA
来源：
GROUP DECISION AND NEGOTIATION | 2009年 / 18卷 / 02期
关键词：
Automated multi-attribute negotiation; Incomplete information; Pareto optimality; Mediating; Win-win; ISSUE NEGOTIATIONS; AGENDA;
D O I：
10.1007/s10726-008-9119-9
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号：
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
Agents in a negotiation may have to negotiate multiple issues simultaneously. Automated multi-attribute negotiation provides an important mechanism for distributed decision makers to reach agreements on multiple issues. Moreover, it also furnishes the opportunity to reach "win-win" solutions. In this paper, we first provide a survey that synthesizes the research on multi-attribute negotiation. We discuss the limitations of the existing research and conclude that three key issues need further study: incomplete information, Pareto optimality, and tractability. We then present a generic framework for automated multi-attribute negotiation with two new mechanisms that address the above issues. Finally, we discuss the challenges and directions for future work.
引用
收藏
页码：169 / 187
页数：19
相关论文
共 31 条
  • [1] [Anonymous], 2004, CMURITR0466
  • [2] Issue-by-issue negotiations: The role of information and time preference
    Bac, M
    Raff, H
    [J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1996, 13 (01) : 125 - 134
  • [3] Bargaining frictions, bargaining procedures and implied costs in multiple-issue bargaining
    Busch, LA
    Horstmann, IJ
    [J]. ECONOMICA, 1997, 64 (256) : 669 - 680
  • [4] The game of negotiations: ordering issues and implementing agreements
    Busch, LA
    Horstmann, IJ
    [J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2002, 41 (02) : 169 - 191
  • [5] A comment on issue-by-issue negotiations
    Busch, LA
    Horstmann, I
    [J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1997, 19 (01) : 144 - 148
  • [6] Signaling via an agenda in multi-issue bargaining with incomplete information
    Busch, LA
    Horstmann, IJ
    [J]. ECONOMIC THEORY, 1999, 13 (03) : 561 - 575
  • [7] Busch LA, 1999, CANADIAN J EC, V32, P956
  • [8] CHEVALEYRE Y, 2005, P 4 INT JOINT C AUT, P296
  • [9] Coehoorn RobertM., 2004, ICEC 04, DOI [10.1145/1052220.1052229, DOI 10.1145/1052220.1052229]
  • [10] Generating pareto solutions in a two-party setting:: Constraint proposal methods
    Ehtamo, H
    Hämäläinen, RP
    Heiskanen, P
    Teich, J
    Verkama, M
    Zionts, S
    [J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1999, 45 (12) : 1697 - 1709
1234