A Generic Framework for Automated Multi-attribute Negotiation

被引：61
作者：
Lai, Guoming [1 ]
Sycara, Katia [2 ]
机构：
[1] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Tepper Sch Business, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA
[2] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Inst Robot, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA
来源：
GROUP DECISION AND NEGOTIATION | 2009年 / 18卷 / 02期
关键词：
Automated multi-attribute negotiation; Incomplete information; Pareto optimality; Mediating; Win-win; ISSUE NEGOTIATIONS; AGENDA;
D O I：
10.1007/s10726-008-9119-9
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号：
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
Agents in a negotiation may have to negotiate multiple issues simultaneously. Automated multi-attribute negotiation provides an important mechanism for distributed decision makers to reach agreements on multiple issues. Moreover, it also furnishes the opportunity to reach "win-win" solutions. In this paper, we first provide a survey that synthesizes the research on multi-attribute negotiation. We discuss the limitations of the existing research and conclude that three key issues need further study: incomplete information, Pareto optimality, and tractability. We then present a generic framework for automated multi-attribute negotiation with two new mechanisms that address the above issues. Finally, we discuss the challenges and directions for future work.
引用
收藏
页码：169 / 187
页数：19
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