Mayoral Partisanship and Municipal Fiscal Policy

被引:112
作者
de Benedictis-Kessner, Justin [1 ]
Warshaw, Christopher [1 ]
机构
[1] MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
关键词
REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY DESIGN; REPRESENTATION; ACCOUNTABILITY; ELECTIONS; POLITICS; MATTER; INSTITUTIONS; STATES;
D O I
10.1086/686308
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Does it matter for municipal policy which party controls the mayorship in municipal government? The bulk of the existing evidence says no. But there are a variety of theoretical reasons to believe that mayoral partisanship should affect municipal policy. We examine the impact of mayoral partisanship in nearly 1,000 elections in medium and large cities over the past 60 years. In contrast to previous work, we find that mayoral partisanship has a significant impact on the size of municipal government. Democratic mayors spend substantially more than Republican mayors. In order to pay for this spending, Democratic mayors issue substantially more debt than Republican mayors and pay more in interest. Our findings show that mayoral partisanship matters for city policy. Our findings add to a growing literature indicating that the constraints imposed on city policy making do not prevent public opinion and elections from having a meaningful impact on municipal policy.
引用
收藏
页码:1124 / 1138
页数:15
相关论文
共 55 条
  • [31] Randomized experiments from non-random selection in US House elections
    Lee, David S.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 2008, 142 (02) : 675 - 697
  • [32] Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics
    Lee, David S.
    Lemieux, Thomas
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE, 2010, 48 (02) : 281 - 355
  • [33] Do voters affect or elect policies? Evidence from the US house
    Lee, DS
    Moretti, E
    Butler, MJ
    [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2004, 119 (03) : 807 - 859
  • [34] Local Institutions and the Politics of Urban Growth
    Lubell, Mark
    Feiock, Richard C.
    de la Cruz, Edgar E. Ramirez
    [J]. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 2009, 53 (03) : 649 - 665
  • [35] Mullins D., 2004, Public Budgeting Finance, V24, P2, DOI DOI 10.1111/J.0275-1100.2004.00344.X
  • [36] Mullins DanielR., 1995, Tax and expenditure limits on local governments
  • [37] *NCSL, 1997, CRIT ISS STAT LOC FI
  • [38] Nivola PietroS., 2002, TENSE COMMANDMENTS F
  • [39] Oliver JE, 2012, LOCAL ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICS OF SMALL-SCALE DEMOCRACY, P1
  • [40] Palus ChristineKelleher., 2010, STATE LOCAL GOVT REV, V42, P133